USA v. Joseph Merlino by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-5-2015 
USA v. Joseph Merlino 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Joseph Merlino" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 452. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/452 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-4341 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JOSEPH MERLINO, 
Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-99-cr-00363-001) 
District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick 
______________ 
 
Argued April 14, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit 
Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  May 5, 2015) 
 
Zane D. Memeger, Esq. 
David E. Fritchey, Esq. 
2 
 
Joseph F. Minni, Esq. 
David E. Troyer, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Office of the United States Attorney 
615 Chestnut Street 
Suite 1250 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 Counsel for Appellee 
 
Edwin J. Jacobs, Jr., Esq. [ARGUED] 
Michael F. Myers, Esq. 
Jacobs & Barbone 
1125 Pacific Avenue 
Atlantic City, NJ 08401 
 
Gary S. Silver, Esq. 
Silver Legal Services 
2000 Market Street 
Suite 2925 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 Counsel for Appellant 
___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 At issue on this appeal is whether a District Court has 
jurisdiction to revoke supervised release when neither an 
arrest warrant nor a summons concerning an alleged violation 
of supervised release was issued before the term of supervised 
release expired.  We hold that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) is a 
jurisdictional statute requiring that a warrant or summons 
3 
 
must issue before the expiration of supervised release in order 
for a District Court to conduct revocation proceedings.  
Because the summons in this matter was issued after the 
termination of supervised release, we conclude that the 
District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to revoke 
supervised release.  Accordingly, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order revoking supervised release and imposing a 
prison term on Appellant Joseph Merlino. 
I.  
Section 3583(i) of Title 18 of the United States Code 
provides: 
Delayed revocation.—The power 
of the court to revoke a term of 
supervised release for violation of 
a condition of supervised release, 
and to order the defendant to 
serve a term of imprisonment . . . 
extends beyond the expiration of 
the term of supervised release for 
any period reasonably necessary 
for the adjudication of matters 
arising before its expiration if, 
before its expiration, a warrant or 
summons has been issued on the 
basis of an allegation of such a 
violation. 
Id. (emphasis added).  We must consider the meaning of this 
statutory provision in the following context. 
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 Merlino, the reputed former head of the Philadelphia 
La Cosa Nostra, commenced a three-year term of supervised 
release on September 7, 2011.  On June 18, 2014, law 
enforcement observed Merlino at a cigar bar in Boca Raton, 
Florida, conversing with several convicted felons, including 
John Ciancaglini, one of Merlino’s former co-defendants.  
The Probation Office concluded that this contact violated the 
terms of Merlino’s supervised release.  Over two months 
later, on August 26, Merlino’s probation officer presented a 
revocation petition to the District Court. 
 On September 2, the District Court ordered the 
issuance of a summons directing Merlino to appear for a 
revocation hearing.  Either later that day or the following day, 
a deputy clerk called defense counsel in an effort to secure a 
mutually agreeable hearing  date for the parties.  Defense 
counsel, citing work obligations and an upcoming medical 
procedure, stated that he expected to be unavailable until 
December.  The Government informed the deputy clerk that it 
was “reluctant” to accommodate any substantial delay. App. 
72.  In response, defense counsel asked the deputy clerk “to 
wait until the end of the following week to set a date” in the 
hope that he could clear his schedule.  Id.  The deputy clerk 
relayed this request to the District Court judge, who assented.  
On September 11, defense counsel informed the clerk that he 
could be available in October.  On September 16, the clerk 
issued a “notice of hearing” summoning Merlino for a 
revocation hearing on October 10.1 
                                              
1 Specifically, the notice stated: 
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 On October 6, defense counsel notified the District 
Court of his belief that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the 
revocation proceedings because no warrant or summons had 
issued before the expiration of Merlino’s term on September 
6, 2014.  At a hearing on the jurisdictional contest, the deputy 
clerk who had spoken to counsel testified that, absent 
counsel’s request for a delay, the notice of hearing would 
have issued on September 2 or 3, before the expiration of 
supervised release.  On that basis, the Court concluded that 
the deadline in § 3583(i) had been equitably tolled, such that 
the notice filed on September 16 was timely. 
 On October 24, the District Court conducted a 
revocation hearing and found that Merlino had violated the 
terms of his release by associating with Ciancaglini.  The 
Court sentenced Merlino to four additional months’ 
                                                                                                     
TAKE NOTICE, That Petition of 
the Probation Officer, a copy of 
which is attached, charges you 
with certain violation[s] which 
may warrant revocation of your 
supervised release.  You are 
directed to appear at the United 
States Courthouse . . . on Friday, 
October 10, 2014, at 10:00 a.m. in 
Courtroom 8-A, at which time 
you will be given a hearing on the 
charges . . . . 
Supp. App. 2 (emphasis omitted). 
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imprisonment, which Merlino began serving on January 15, 
2015.  He timely appealed. 
II.  
 The District Court claimed jurisdiction to revoke 
supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i).  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of 
jurisdictional issues is plenary.  United States v. Sczubelek, 
402 F.3d 175, 178 (3d Cir. 2005). 
III.  
A.  
 The overarching question presented here is whether the 
District Court, on these facts, had subject-matter jurisdiction 
to hold a revocation hearing when no warrant or summons 
was issued prior to the expiration of Merlino’s supervised 
release.  We begin with the principle that “[f]ederal courts are 
courts of limited jurisdiction.  They possess only that power 
authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be 
expanded by judicial decree.”  Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 
Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted).  In this 
matter, the pertinent congressional enactment states that 
“[t]he power of the court to revoke a term of supervised 
release . . . extends beyond the expiration of the term of 
supervised release . . . if, before its expiration, a warrant or 
summons has been issued . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 3583(i).  This 
language is clear and unequivocal.  Read literally, a warrant 
or summons must issue before a term of supervised release 
expires in order for the District Court to exercise its authority 
to revoke supervised release.  The District Court, evidently 
acknowledging the import of this condition, nevertheless 
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found that § 3583(i) was subject to “equitable tolling.”  We 
disagree, and to explain why we hold that the timely issuance 
of a summons or warrant is jurisdictional, some historical 
context is in order. 
B.  
 In 1948, Congress provided that, prior to the expiration 
of the maximum five-year period of probation, the district 
court had the authority to “issue a warrant for [the 
probationer’s] arrest for violation of probation occurring 
during the probation period.”  18 U.S.C. § 3653 (repealed 
1987).  Once the probationer was arrested on the warrant, he 
was to be taken before the court “as speedily as possible,” 
after which the court had the authority to conduct revocation 
proceedings.  Id.  Over time, several federal circuits 
addressed the question of whether a federal district court 
retained subject-matter jurisdiction when a probationer 
allegedly violated the terms of probation shortly before the 
expiration date, thus requiring the revocation hearing to occur 
after the term’s expiration.  Our own view was that so long as 
the probationer was produced before the district court “[a]s 
speedily as possible after arrest” in accordance with § 3653, 
we saw no good reason “why a court should arbitrarily lose 
jurisdiction . . . when the alleged probation violation took 
place within [the five-year probation window] and the 
probationer was formally notified within that period that the 
Government would seek to revoke his probation.”  United 
States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 835 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 Although our sister circuits unanimously agreed that 
Congress could not have intended for district courts to 
abruptly lose jurisdiction over already initiated revocation 
proceedings at the expiration of the five-year window, 
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varying standards emerged as to the precise triggering event 
for continuing jurisdiction.  For our part, we required that 
“formal revocation proceedings [be] commenced (by arrest 
warrant or otherwise) within the five-year period.”  Id.  The 
Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits identified the trigger 
as the Government’s filing of the revocation petition prior to 
the term’s expiration.  See United States v. Barton, 26 F.3d 
490, 491–92 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Schimmel, 950 
F.2d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. O’Quinn, 689 
F.2d 1359, 1360–61 (11th Cir. 1982).  The Eighth Circuit 
found jurisdiction even where no revocation petition had been 
filed and no arrest warrant had issued, but the probationer 
consensually appeared before the district court prior to the 
expiration of his term.  United States v. Strada, 503 F.2d 
1081, 1083 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 In 1994, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 3583 to make 
clear that the exercise of judicial authority over supervised 
releasees depended upon the issuance of a warrant or 
summons while the releasee was still under supervision.2  
According to an “Explanation of Provisions” included in the 
Congressional Record, § 3583(i) “provid[es] continued court 
jurisdiction to adjudicate alleged supervised release violations 
and revoke supervised release” after its expiration.  137 Cong. 
Rec. S7769 (1991).  And in the view of the Second Circuit, 
“the most likely purpose of the amendment was to make 
absolutely clear Congress’ earlier intention that sentencing 
courts have the authority to hold hearings to revoke or extend 
                                              
2 A nearly identical provision provides for continuing 
jurisdiction over violations of federal probation.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 3565(c). 
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supervised release after expiration of the original term if they 
issue a summons or warrant during the release period.”  
United States v. Morales, 45 F.3d 693, 701 (2d Cir. 1995).  
See also Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 179.   
C.  
 We now turn to the Government’s argument that § 
3583(i) is subject to equitable tolling because it is not a 
jurisdictional provision.  We assess this position in light of 
Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 610 (2010), in which 
the Supreme Court provided guidelines for the classification 
of federal statutory deadlines, the consequences for 
noncompliance with such deadlines, and the availability of 
tolling.  The Dolan framework divides federal statutory 
deadlines into three broad categories, based in large part on 
the “statutory language, [] the relevant context, and [] what 
they reveal about the purposes that a time limit is designed to 
serve.”  Id.  First, the Court acknowledged that certain 
deadlines are “jurisdictional,” in the sense that they “prevent[] 
the court from permitting or taking the action to which the 
statute attached the deadline.  The prohibition is absolute.  
The parties cannot waive it, nor can a court extend that 
deadline for equitable reasons.”  Id.  See, e.g., Bowles v. 
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 208–14 (2007) (no equitable relief for 
defendant who missed appellate filing deadline in reliance on 
district court’s erroneous order).  Second, the Court identified 
procedural “claims-processing” rules that “do not limit a 
court’s jurisdiction, but rather regulate the timing of motions 
or claims brought before the court.  Unless a party points out 
to the court that another litigant has missed such a deadline, 
the party forfeits the deadline’s protection.”  Dolan, 560 U.S. 
at 610.  And third, the Court characterized some deadlines as 
“time-related directive[s]” that are “legally enforceable but 
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do[] not deprive a judge or other public official of the power 
to take the action to which the deadline applies if the deadline 
is missed.”  Id. at 611.  
 Dolan itself concerned the repercussions of 
noncompliance with 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), which provides 
a deadline for restitution orders in the context of criminal 
sentencing.  The Court held that “a sentencing court that 
misses the 90-day deadline nonetheless retains the power to 
order restitution—at least where, as here, the sentencing court 
made clear prior to the deadline’s expiration that it would 
order restitution . . . .”  Id. at 608.  The Court cited the fact 
that the rule “does not specify a consequence for 
noncompliance with its timing provisions,” and noted that 
characterizing the statute as jurisdictional would undermine 
its remedial purpose, which was to assure that criminal 
defendants pay restitution to victims.  Id. at 611–14.  
 The Government argues that here, like in Dolan, (1) 
the relevant rule fails to specify consequences for 
noncompliance, and (2) strict enforcement would defeat the 
purpose of the statute, which is, in the Government’s view, 
“to assure the defendant’s proper compliance and 
accountability through the complete period of supervised 
release.”  Gov. Br. at 31.  And the Government further 
suggests that strict construction of the rule would result in 
“absurd” consequences such as windfalls to defendants who 
violate the terms of their release immediately prior to its 
expiration.  Gov. Br. at 32–33 (citing United States v. Brown, 
333 U.S. 18, 27 (1948) (“No rule of construction necessitates 
our acceptance of an interpretation resulting in patently 
absurd consequences.”)). 
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 Section § 3583(i) is noteworthy, however, insofar as it 
does not merely set a deadline—it expressly authorizes a 
grant of “power” to the district court and conditions the 
existence of that power on a specific and minimally onerous 
event.  See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 
(1994) (“[J]urisdictional statutes ‘speak to the power of the 
court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties.’” 
(quoting Republic Nat’l Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 
U.S. 80, 100 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring))).  The plain 
language of the statute, then, compels the conclusion that the 
deadline is jurisdictional.3 
 This conclusion is bolstered by the strict application of 
§ 3583(i) by other federal courts.  In United States v. Janvier, 
for instance, the district court ordered the issuance of a 
warrant on the defendant’s final day of supervised release, but 
the warrant was not issued until two days after the expiration 
of the term.  599 F.3d 204, 265–69 (2d Cir. 2010).  The 
Second Circuit found irrelevant the fact that the Government 
had made unsuccessful efforts to obtain a warrant within the 
term.  And another district court reached the same outcome 
on facts nearly identical to those presented here.  See United 
States v. Hazel, 106 F. Supp. 2d 14, 14–15 (D.D.C. 2000).  
There, as here, the district court ordered the issuance of a 
summons before expiration of supervised release, and defense 
                                              
3 The Government conceded at oral argument that 
there is some temporal limitation on a district court’s 
jurisdiction over a supervised release.  Specifically, it agreed 
that a district court would not have authority to conduct 
revocation proceedings if a revocation petition was not filed 
until after the expiration of supervised release. 
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counsel discussed a hearing date with the clerk before 
expiration of supervised release, but the summons was 
ultimately issued only after the expiration of supervised 
release.4   
 The Government offers no basis on which to 
distinguish Janvier and Hazel, and submits that they were 
decided incorrectly.  Instead, like the District Court, it relies 
on United States v. English, 400 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 2005).  In 
that case, prior to the expiration of the defendant’s supervised 
release, the district court inadvertently issued a defective 
warrant bearing the wrong defendant’s name.  The Fifth 
Circuit invoked the Supreme Court’s admonition in Irwin v. 
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990), that 
equitable tolling is appropriate “in situations where the 
claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a 
defective pleading during the statutory period.”  English, 400 
F.3d at 275.  But despite phrasing its holding in terms of 
equity, the panel ultimately emphasized that “[m]ost 
importantly, as in Irwin, the defective document, along with 
the petition and the order, were filed before the statutory 
                                              
4 Many other courts have likewise referred to § 3583(i) 
as “jurisdictional.”  See, e.g., United States v. Juarez-
Velasquez, 763 F.3d 430, 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2014); United 
States v. Hacker, 450 F.3d 808, 814–15 (8th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 427 F.3d 567, 579–80 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (per curiam).  The same is true of the supervised 
release cases that predated § 3583(i). See, e.g., United States 
v. Morales, 45 F.3d 693, 696, 701–702 (2d Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Barton, 26 F.3d 490, 491 (4th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Neville, 985 F.2d 992, 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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period had expired.”  Id. at 276.  We thus read English as a 
recognition that even a warrant containing a technical error 
may satisfy § 3583(i)’s mandate only so long as that warrant 
is issued prior to the statutory deadline. 
 Nor are we persuaded by the Government’s suggestion 
that strict application of § 3583(i) will result in routine 
windfalls to opportunistic criminal defendants.  As noted by 
the Second Circuit in Janvier, the Government could have 
satisfied its minimal burden here in a variety of ways—most 
notably by seeking a summons earlier, but also by asking the 
court to issue a summons with a control date, i.e., a date on 
which the parties briefly appear and agree upon further 
scheduling.  Tellingly, there is no evidence in the record that 
any governmental actor brought the approaching deadline to 
the Court’s attention at any relevant time.  The fact that the 
Government is a sophisticated and repeat player in these 
interactions, however, comforts us that the failure to meet the 
statutory deadline exhibited in this case will be an isolated 
occurrence. 
 Finally, we must address the occasional reference in 
our case law to the notion that a district court’s jurisdiction 
over revocation proceedings stems not only from § 3583(i), 
but also from the broader grant of jurisdiction in 18 U.S.C. § 
3231 over “all offenses against the laws of the United States.”  
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 369 F.3d 250, 252 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (noting that the district court had jurisdiction over 
revocation proceedings under § 3231 and “more specifically” 
under § 3583(i)).  On this theory, one might suggest that § 
3583(i) imposes a “mandatory but nonjurisdictional” barrier 
to the exercise of the District Court’s power to impose 
sanctions for a violation of supervised where a warrant or 
summons is not issued prior to the expiration of release.  
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Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 656 (2012).  Although 
courts have a duty to enforce a mandatory nonjurisdictional 
rule when it is properly and timely invoked, application of 
such rules may be waived, Eberhart v. United States, 546 
U.S. 12, 17–18 (2005) (per curiam), and they are subject to a 
rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling, Irwin v. Dep’t of 
Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990).  For all of the 
aforementioned reasons, however—including the plain 
language of the statute, its historical context, and the weight 
of the case law applying it—we conclude that § 3583(i) is in 
fact jurisdictional and thus not subject to equitable tolling. 
IV.  
 The Government argues that the District Court’s order 
directing the issuance of a summons, taken in combination 
with notice to Merlino’s counsel, satisfied § 3583(i)’s 
requirement that “a warrant or summons [be] issued.”  The 
United States Code does not define “summons” for purposes 
of § 3583, although the term is defined elsewhere in the 
context of federal criminal proceedings.  For instance, the 
Code’s general guidelines pertaining to “Arrest and 
Commitment” direct the reader to Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 4 and 9.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3046.  Rule 4 states that a 
summons on a criminal complaint “must be in the same form 
as a warrant except that it must require the defendant to 
appear before a magistrate judge at a stated time and place.”  
Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(b)(2).  A warrant on a criminal complaint 
must: 
(A) contain the defendant’s name 
or, if it is unknown, a name or 
description by which the 
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defendant can be identified with 
reasonable certainty; 
(B) describe the offense charged 
in the complaint; 
(C) command that the defendant 
be arrested and brought without 
unnecessary delay before a 
magistrate judge or, if none is 
reasonably available, before a 
state or local judicial officer; and 
(D) be signed by a judge. 
Id. 4(b)(1).  Where founded on a criminal indictment or 
information, both documents must be signed by the clerk.  Id. 
9(b). 
 Although these definitions lack controlling weight in 
this context, see, e.g., United States v. Bernardine, 237 F.3d 
1279, 1281 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001), they reaffirm that a 
summons traditionally is a document afforded special weight 
due to its role in the formal initiation of both civil and 
criminal proceedings.  See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 1665 
(10th ed. 2014) (defining summons as a “writ or process 
commencing the plaintiff’s action and requiring the defendant 
to appear and answer”); Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 1238 
(3d ed. 1969) (defining summons as “original process upon a 
proper service of which an action is commenced and the 
defendant therein named brought within the jurisdiction of the 
court”).   
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 To repeat, the Government’s position is that the 
September 2 order directing the issuance of a summons, 
which was served electronically on counsel, functionally 
served as a summons: it put Merlino on notice of his 
obligation to appear, and did so prior to the expiration of the 
term of supervised release.  But crucially, the September 2 
order fails to meet even the textbook definition of a summons 
because it does not “requir[e] the defendant to appear and 
answer.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1665.  Because the order 
only authorized the issuance of a summons, and did not issue 
a summons on its own, Merlino would have never been 
legally “requir[ed] . . . to appear and answer” absent the 
September 16 summons (which issued only after the 
expiration of supervised release). 
 Nor do we find it particularly relevant that Merlino’s 
counsel learned of the revocation proceedings by telephone 
prior to the statutory deadline because § 3583(i) permits 
jurisdiction only “if . . . a summons . . . has been issued . . . .”  
“Issue,” in turn, means “[t]o be put forth officially.”  Black’s 
Law Dictionary 960.  We cannot conclude that a deputy 
clerk’s informal communication with counsel, even taken in 
conjunction with the District Court’s order that a summons be 
issued, is the functional equivalent of the “issuance” of a 
“summons” in this context.5 
                                              
5  The Government attaches great significance to the 
fact that Merlino was placed on notice of the revocation 
proceedings prior to the expiration of the statutory deadline.  
Section 3583(i), however, does not speak in terms of 
“notice.”  Instead, it turns on “issu[ance].”  To wit, the 
issuance of a warrant or summons, even if not executed or 
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 Moreover, every court to have considered this 
argument has rejected it.  See Janvier, 599 F.3d at 268 (order 
to issue a warrant not sufficient under § 3583(i)); United 
States v. Hondras, 176 F. Supp. 2d 855, 857 (E.D. Wis. 2001) 
(same); United States v. Hazel, 106 F. Supp. 2d 14, 15 
(D.D.C. 2000) (order to set a revocation hearing with 
voluntary appearance not sufficient under § 3583(i)).  In 
particular, we find the Second Circuit’s justification for its 
holding convincing: 
[T]o adopt the government’s 
argument would be to rewrite the 
statute to say something that it 
does not say because we or the 
government think the revised 
version would be preferable.  The 
language of the statute . . . is 
simply inconsistent with this 
approach.  The statute states that 
the extension of jurisdiction 
occurs when “a warrant or 
                                                                                                     
served upon the releasee prior to the expiration of release, 
satisfies § 3583(i).  See, e.g., United States v. Ramos, 401 
F.3d 111, 116–18 (2d Cir. 2005).  In other words, the plain 
language of § 3583(i) gives no indication that notice plays 
any role in determining whether the deadline has been 
satisfied in a given case.  By this, of course, we do not mean 
to overlook the separate and unrelated requirement that any 
delay between the issuance of a warrant, its eventual 
execution, and conclusion of the revocation proceedings be 
“reasonably necessary.”  18 U.S.C. § 3583(i). 
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summons has been issued,” 
clearly referencing the issuance of 
a warrant as an action that has 
been perfected.  The order of the 
district court, in contrast, merely 
directed “[t]he [i]ssuance of a 
[w]arrant,” clearly contemplating 
the issuance of the warrant as an 
act ordered to occur at some 
future time.  By its own terms, the 
order does not issue a warrant; it 
directs someone else to issue one.  
That order was not carried out 
until two days later, after the 
expiration of Janvier’s term of 
supervised release. 
Janvier, 599 F.3d at 268 (emphasis in original). 
 Our dissenting colleague, despite agreeing that § 
3583(i) is jurisdictional, makes a somewhat different 
argument from the Government: she contends that “an 
affirmative act of the court to gather the parties to address the 
alleged violation of its judgment” may satisfy § 3583(i) where 
such act was “functionally equivalent to and served the 
purpose of a summons.”  Dissent at 4–5.  But we are mindful 
that “statutes conferring jurisdiction on federal courts are to 
be strictly construed, and doubts resolved against federal 
jurisdiction.”  Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 748 F.2d 
1058, 1067 (5th Cir. 1984); F & S Constr. Co. v. Jensen, 337 
F.2d 160, 161 (10th Cir. 1964).  Adoption of a “functional 
equivalence” test here would signal a return to the amorphous 
jurisdictional practices exemplified by the case law predating 
§ 3583(i).  Like the Second Circuit, we are unwilling to 
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“contemplate strained readings that would blur the bright line 
provided by Congress,” particularly “[g]iven the ease with 
which the statute can be satisfied.”  Janvier, 599 F.3d at 268.  
In sum, we reject the argument that anything other than the 
formal issuance of a warrant or summons can satisfy the 
mandate of § 3583(i).6 
V.  
 Because the jurisdictional deadline described in § 
3583(i) is not subject to equitable tolling, and because no 
warrant or summons was issued prior to the expiration of 
Merlino’s term of supervised release on September 6, 2014, 
we conclude that the District Court lacked subject-matter 
jurisdicition over Merlino’s revocation proceedings. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order of 
October 24, 2014. 
                                              
6 Merlino also argues that the evidence presented at the 
violation hearing was insufficient to support the District 
Court’s conclusion that he “associated with” a convicted 
felon in violation of the conditions of his supervised release.  
Because we are vacating the District Court’s order on 
jurisdictional grounds, we will not address this argument. 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring 
 Does the deadline to issue a warrant or summons under 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) limit the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
district court to revoke supervised release after the end of the 
supervision period, or does it merely limit the court’s 
remedial power to do so?  The great weight of circuit court 
authority supports the conclusion that the deadline is 
jurisdictional.  Moreover, “statutes conferring jurisdiction on 
federal courts are to be strictly construed, and doubts resolved 
against federal jurisdiction.”  Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 
748 F.2d 1058, 1067 (5th Cir. 1984); F & S Constr. Co. v. 
Jensen, 337 F.2d 160, 161 (10th Cir. 1964).  It is thus 
appropriate to reverse the District Court’s order revoking Mr. 
Merlino’s supervised release because the September 2, 2014 
petition did not satisfy the provision’s bright-line requirement 
that a summons or warrant issue before the end of the 
supervision period on September 6.  In this context, I concur 
with the result set out in Judge Vanaskie’s opinion. 
 That noted, I write separately to acknowledge 
countervailing considerations, including recent Supreme 
Court cases, that raise doubt about whether Congress intended 
§ 3583(i) to be jurisdictional rather than “mandatory but 
nonjurisdictional.”  Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 656 
(2012).  Like jurisdictional rules, the courts have a duty to 
enforce a mandatory nonjurisdictional rule when it is properly 
invoked.  Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 17–18 
(2005) (per curiam).  But unlike jurisdictional rules, 
nonjurisdictional rules are waived if not invoked, id., and are 
subject to a rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling, Irwin 
v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990). 
 The jurisdictional status of § 3583(i) is complicated by 
our own inconsistency in identifying the source of a district 
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to revoke supervised 
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release even in run-of-the-mill cases where revocation occurs 
during the supervision period.  We usually cite 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231, which grants “original jurisdiction . . . [over] all 
offenses against the laws of the United States.”  See, e.g., 
United States v. Paladino, 769 F.3d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 2014); 
United States v. Thornhill, 759 F.3d 299, 306 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2014); United States v. Clark, 726 F.3d 496, 500 (3d Cir. 
2013); United States v. Young, 634 F.3d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 
2011); United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 769 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2010); United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 850 (3d Cir. 
2006); see also United States v. Walker, 742 F.3d 614, 616 
(5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Griffin, 413 F.3d 806, 807 
(8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Jackson, 176 F.3d 1175, 
1176 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
 In a few cases, however, we have cited both § 3231 
and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) as the sources of subject-matter 
jurisdiction to revoke during the supervision period.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 290 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2014); United States v. Dillon, 725 F.3d 362, 365 (3d Cir. 
2013); United States v. Carter, 730 F.3d 187, 190 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2013).  It would be strange if § 3583(e) were the source of 
subject-matter jurisdiction for revocations of supervised 
release.  That provision merely says that the “court may . . . 
revoke a term of supervised release . . . if the court . . . finds 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
violated a condition of supervised release.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583(e)(3).  This appears to “specify[] the remedial power[] 
of the court” to revoke supervised release rather than grant 
subject-matter jurisdiction.  See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (emphasis omitted). 
Section 3231 is the more plausible source of subject-
matter jurisdiction for revocations of supervised release 
generally.  It provides a clear grant of “original jurisdiction” 
in criminal cases.  18 U.S.C. § 3231.  That grant includes 
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jurisdiction to impose a sentence, which can contain a period 
of supervised release.  See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 663 
F.3d 177, 179 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Charles, 467 
F.3d 828, 830 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Ricks, 5 
F.3d 48, 49 (3d Cir. 1993) (per curiam); United States v. 
Castro-Verdugo, 750 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014); United 
States v. Rosales-Garcia, 667 F.3d 1348, 1350 (10th Cir. 
2012).  I also read § 3231 to give a court jurisdiction to 
supervise a defendant on release, to ensure he satisfies the 
requirements of his sentence, and to revoke supervised release 
if he fails to do so. 
Section 3231 includes no express time limit for its 
grant of subject-matter jurisdiction.  The District Court thus 
had jurisdiction to revoke Merlino’s supervised release unless 
some other legal rule stripped the Court of its jurisdiction.1  
                                              
1 Other legal rules not relevant here extinguish a district 
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to vacate a conviction or 
modify a sentence.  For instance, there is a “basic principle of 
judicial process” that a district court loses jurisdiction to 
vacate a conviction after the circuit court decides an appeal.  
Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 17.  Some circuits have held that 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) extinguishes a 
district court’s jurisdiction to vacate a conviction even earlier, 
when the deadline for filing a notice of appeal has passed.  
See, e.g., United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1013 (9th 
Cir. 2000).  Similarly, except under limited circumstances, 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
35(a) strip a district court of jurisdiction to modify a sentence 
14 days after sentencing.  See United States v. Higgs, 504 
F.3d 456, 463-64 (3d Cir. 2007).  None of these rules, 
however, indicate when a district court loses jurisdiction to 
revoke supervised release. 
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As I am unaware of any other legal rule that would do so, the 
focus is whether § 3583(i) strips the district court of subject-
matter jurisdiction to revoke supervised release after its 
expiration if a summons or warrant was not issued 
beforehand. 
Over the last two decades the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly admonished lower courts to draw “a stricter 
distinction between truly jurisdictional rules, which govern a 
court’s adjudicatory authority, and nonjurisdictional . . . rules, 
which do not.”  Thaler, 132 S. Ct. at 648 (internal quotation 
marks omitted); Steel Co., 523 U.S at 90.  A rule is 
jurisdictional if there is a “‘clear’ indication that Congress 
wanted [it] to be ‘jurisdictional.’”  Henderson ex rel. 
Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011) (quoting 
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006)).  It 
need not use “magic words.”  Id.  In ascertaining “clear” 
intent, we “look[] to [1] statutory language, to [2] the relevant 
context, and to [3] what they reveal about the purposes that a 
time limit is designed to serve.”  Dolan v. United States, 560 
U.S. 605, 610 (2010).  I lay out below what I perceive to be 
the key arguments for and against reading the deadline under 
§ 3583(i) as a jurisdictional requirement for revocations of 
supervised release after the end of the supervision period. 
A. Statutory Text 
Several features of § 3583(i) are relevant to the 
inquiry.  At the outset, its title, “Delayed Revocation,” gives 
no evidence Congress intended the provision to be 
jurisdictional.  See Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. at 1205.  And the 
language of the provision expressly “extends” the court’s 
authority rather than curtails it.  A grant of authority can 
impliedly take something away, but it is natural to read 
§ 3583(i) as adding power to the district court—whether it be 
remedial or jurisdictional—rather than subtracting it. 
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 Next, § 3583(i) refers to the “power of the court.”  
This is significant evidence that Congress intended for the 
provision to be jurisdictional because “power of the court” is 
commonly associated with “jurisdiction.”  See, e.g., Landgraf 
v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994) 
(“[J]urisdictional statutes speak to the power of the 
court . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Steel Co., 
523 U.S. at 89 (“[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction [is] the courts’ 
statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” 
(emphasis in original)); United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. 
691, 709 (1832) (“The power to hear and determine a cause is 
jurisdiction . . . .”).  But I note that “power of the court” also 
has non-jurisdictional meanings, including the remedial 
authority of the court.  See Sioux Honey Ass’n v. Hartford 
Fire Ins. Co., 672 F.3d 1041, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[A] 
court’s power to grant relief is not synonymous with its 
ability to exercise jurisdiction, as these two concepts are 
separate and distinct.  Power does not necessarily envelop the 
concept of jurisdiction.”). 
 In the supervised-release context, there are reasons to 
think that “power of the court” refers to this remedial 
authority rather than subject-matter jurisdiction.  In 
administering criminal laws, courts frequently use “power of 
the court” in just this way.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 360 (7th Cir. 2005) (referring to 
the “power of the court to depart upward from the Guidelines 
range”); United States v. Turner, 389 F.3d 111, 120 (4th Cir. 
2004) (referring to “the power of the court to fix the 
maximum sentence[]” (quoting Binkley v. Hunter, 170 F.2d 
848, 849 (10th Cir. 1948)); United States v. Diaz, 245 F.3d 
294, 301 (3d Cir. 2001) (referring in a parenthetical to the 
“power of district courts [at sentencing] . . . to consider 
circumstances not considered by the [U.S.] Sentencing 
Commission”); United States v. Waugh, 207 F.3d 1098, 1101 
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(8th Cir. 2000) (referring to the “power of the Court to 
impose consecutive sentences”). 
 And in other (admittedly unrelated) contexts, some 
statutes refer to the court’s “power” without appearing to be 
jurisdictional.  See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 7253(g)(3) (“The Court 
shall have the power provided under [28 U.S.C. § 361] to 
award reimbursement for the reasonable expenses described 
in that section.”); 38 U.S.C. § 7265(a) (“The Court [of 
Appeals for Veterans Claims] shall have power to punish by 
fine or imprisonment such contempt of its authority as . . . 
misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as 
to obstruct the administration of justice . . . .”); 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1735f-14(d)(4) (“[T]he court [of appeals] shall have 
the power to order payment of the penalty imposed by the 
Secretary [of Housing and Urban Development].”); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3537a(c)(4)(D) (same). 
 And though Congress need not use magic words to 
confer jurisdiction, when it references the court’s “power” in 
provisions that appear to be jurisdictional it frequently also 
inserts the word “jurisdiction.”  See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 47d(b) 
(“A determination made by the Attorney General 
under section 47b of this title shall be final and conclusive 
and no court shall have power or jurisdiction to review it.”); 
42 U.S.C. § 2014(j) (“Any determination by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission or the Secretary of Energy, as 
appropriate, that such an event has, or has not, occurred shall 
be final and conclusive, and no other official or any court 
shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such 
determination.”); 42 U.S.C. § 2184 (“No court shall have 
jurisdiction or power to stay, restrain, or otherwise enjoin the 
use of any invention or discovery by a patent licensee, to the 
extent that such use is licensed by section 2183(b) or 2183(e) 
of this title.”); 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (“The Court of Appeals 
for Veterans Claims shall have exclusive jurisdiction to 
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review decisions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals . . . .  
The Court shall have power to affirm, modify, or reverse a 
decision of the Board or to remand the matter, as 
appropriate.”); 32 U.S.C. § 326 (“In the National Guard not in 
Federal service, there are general, special, and summary 
courts-martial constituted like similar courts of the Army and 
the Air Force.  They have the jurisdiction and powers, except 
as to punishments, and shall follow the forms and procedures, 
provided for those courts.”); 16 U.S.C. § 820 (“The Attorney 
General may . . . institute proceedings in equity in the 
district court . . . for the purpose of revoking for violation of 
its terms any permit or license issued hereunder . . . .  The 
district courts shall have jurisdiction over all of the above-
mentioned proceedings and shall have power to issue and 
execute all necessary process and to make and enforce all 
writs, orders and decrees to compel compliance with the 
lawful orders and regulations of the commission . . . .”).  That 
Congress omitted “jurisdiction” from § 3583(i) may be 
telling. 
Finally, jurisdictional terminology does not necessarily 
mean Congress intended that a statutory requirement 
implicate subject-matter jurisdiction and that it be treated as 
non-waivable and non-tollable.  For example, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11046(c) says that the “district court shall have jurisdiction 
in actions brought . . . against an owner or operator of a 
facility to enforce the requirement concerned and to impose 
any civil penalty provided for violation of that requirement.”  
This provision is not jurisdictional as to subject matter 
because it merely “specif[ies] the remedial powers of the 
court.”  Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90 (emphasis omitted).  The 
same could be said of § 3583(i) if it extends the remedial 
“power of the court to revoke a term of supervised release” 
(and, by implication, punish violations of release conditions). 
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B. Context 
We also look to statutory context for evidence of 
congressional intent.  First, the Supreme Court sometimes 
looks to the location of a provision within a larger statute.  
See, e.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 162 
(2010); Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. at 1205.  Subsection 3583(i) is 
sandwiched in the middle of § 3583, which contains the 
procedural and substantive rules governing modification and 
revocation of supervised release.  This is not where we 
typically find jurisdictional provisions.  Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. at 
1205. 
Second, legislative history may also shed light on 
whether Congress intended to treat a provision as 
jurisdictional.  True enough, according to an “Explanation of 
Provisions” included in the Congressional Record, § 3583(i) 
“provid[es] continued court jurisdiction to adjudicate alleged 
supervised release violations and revoke supervised release” 
after its expiration.  137 Cong. Rec. S7769 (1991).  This lends 
modest support to a jurisdictional reading of § 3583(i).  For a 
statement that was no doubt written by a staff person, that 
was published in the Congressional Record three years before 
the enactment of § 3583(i), and was never uttered on the 
Congressional floor, can hardly be strong evidence of 
legislative intent.  Moreover, the statement was published 
years before the Supreme Court began demanding a stricter 
distinction between truly jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional 
rules.  It is therefore hard to tell whether the staff person was 
referring to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction—and 
intended § 3583(i) to be non-waivable and non-tollable—or 
merely its remedial authority to revoke supervised release.  
See Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 18 (acknowledging that in the past 
the Supreme Court “more than occasionally used the term 
‘jurisdictional’ to describe” inflexible but non-jurisdictional 
deadlines); United States v. Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679, 692 (7th 
9 
 
Cir. 2002) (“[J]udges and legislators sometimes use the term 
jurisdiction to erroneously refer to a court’s authority to issue 
a specific type of remedy[] rather than to the court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction.” (emphasis added)). 
Finally, the Supreme Court has considered the 
historical treatment of similar statutory provisions.  For 
example, 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) allows district courts to grant a 
14-day extension to file a notice of appeal.  In Bowles v. 
Russell, the district court granted a 17-day extension, and the 
notice of appeal was filed 16 days later.  551 U.S. 205, 207 
(2007).  Relying on a long-standing practice of treating 
deadlines for filing a notice of appeal as jurisdictional, the 
Supreme Court held that the court of appeals lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction.  Id. at 209 n.2 (“[I]t is indisputable that 
time limits for filing a notice of appeal have been treated as 
jurisdictional in American law for well over a century.”).  
Bowles relied on a theory of congressional acquiescence 
based on “a long line of . . . decisions left undisturbed by 
Congress.”  See Union Pac. v. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive 
Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 558 U.S. 67, 
82 (2009); Thaler, 132 S. Ct. at 648 n.3; Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 
at 1203. 
The historical treatment of § 3583(i) here differs from 
Bowles.  The Supreme Court has never cited § 3583(i), let 
alone spoken to its jurisdictional status.  It has also never 
cited § 3565(c), the analogous provision for probation.  And 
in contrast with a century’s worth of precedent in Bowles, 
§ 3583(i) has existed but two decades.  Thaler, 132 S. Ct. at 
648 n.3 (“Congress did not enact the indication requirement 
[under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3)] until 1996.  There is thus no 
long line of this Court’s decisions left undisturbed by 
Congress on which to rely.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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Myriad lower courts have referred to § 3583(i)2 and 
§ 3565(c)3 as implicating jurisdiction, and none of them to my 
knowledge have questioned that proposition. Yet I am aware 
of only two published circuit court cases where the 
jurisdictional label expressly affected the outcome.4  See 
Juarez-Velasquez, 763 F.3d 430, 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(expressly vacating for lack of jurisdiction a revocation order 
issued after expiration of supervised release and without a 
                                              
2 See, e.g., United States v. Janvier, 599 F.3d 264, 264 (2d 
Cir. 2010); Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 180; United States v. 
Lominac, 144 F.3d 308, 310 n.2 (4th Cir. 1998), abrogated on 
other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 
(2000); United States v. Juarez-Velasquez, 763 F.3d 430, 436 
(5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Madden, 515 F.3d 601, 608 
(6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d 
901, 907 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Okoko, 365 F.3d 
962, 964 n.3, 967 (11th Cir. 2004). The same is true of the 
supervised release cases that predated § 3583(i). See, e.g., 
United States v. Morales, 45 F.3d 693, 696, 701–702 (2d Cir. 
1995); United States v. Barton, 26 F.3d 490, 491 (4th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Neville, 985 F.2d 992, 994, 999 (9th 
Cir. 1993). 
3 See, e.g., United States v. Crisler, 501 F.3d 1151, 1152 
(10th Cir. 2007). 
4 Two other cases considered the absence of a timely 
summons or warrant even though the defendant failed to raise 
the issue in the district court, but this did not affect the 
outcome of the case because the circuit court concluded the 
district court did have jurisdiction for reasons not pertinent 
here.  See United States v. Ortuno-Higareda, 450 F.3d 406, 
409–411 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated by 479 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 
2007); United States v. Hacker, 450 F.3d 808, 814 n.4, 816 
(8th Cir. 2006). 
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timely summons or warrant even though the defendant failed 
to raise the issue in the district court); United States v. Ortiz-
Hernandez, 427 F.3d 567, 579–80 (9th Cir. 2004) (per 
curiam) (same).  Moreover, no circuit court case referring to 
§ 3583(i) as jurisdictional has provided reasoning or cited 
Supreme Court cases that admonish a stricter use of the term 
“jurisdiction.”  We generally don’t afford much weight to 
drive-by jurisdictional decisions, Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511, 
and I believe neither does Congress. 
In a capsule, Bowles’s theory of congressional 
acquiescence is likely inapplicable here where there is no 
Supreme Court precedent interpreting § 3583(i) or any other 
similar provision; where § 3583(i) is only two-decades old; 
where so many cases have called the provision jurisdictional 
yet the outcome of so few cases has been affected by that 
label; and where not one has explained why it should be 
jurisdictional. 
C. Statutory Purpose 
 The Supreme Court also looks to statutory purpose to 
determine whether Congress intended for a provision to be 
jurisdictional.  Dolan, 560 U.S. at 610.  Obvious purposes of 
§ 3583, which generally governs revocation of supervised 
release, include protecting society, punishing offenders, and 
deterring future offenders.  A jurisdictional reading of the 
timing requirement under § 3583(i) would frustrate these 
purposes by precluding revocations for late-term violations in 
cases where the Government had no opportunity to obtain a 
timely warrant or summons.  See Thaler, 132 S. Ct. at 650. 
Congress likely enacted § 3583(i) to balance the need 
to revoke supervised release for late-term violations with the 
need to protect defendants from hasty revocation hearings 
held at the 11th hour.  See United States v. Janvier, 599 F.3d 
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264, 265-66 (2d Cir. 2010).  Treating § 3583(i) as 
jurisdictional—that is, non-waivable and non-tollable—would 
serve neither objective here.  Statutory purpose thus provides 
little evidence Congress intended the deadline in § 3583(i) to 
be jurisdictional. 
*    *    *    *    * 
Ultimately I am swayed that § 3583(i) is jurisdictional 
by the provision’s reference to the “power of the court,” by 
the legislative history (weak as it is) saying the provision 
grants “jurisdiction,” and by the many circuit court cases 
calling it jurisdictional (though without even questioning 
whether the label is appropriate).  While I concur with the 
result stated by Judge Vanaskie, I find this to be a close issue 
and am surprised federal courts have yet to wrestle with it. 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part.  
 I agree with the majority that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) is a 
jurisdictional statute but conclude that the unique facts here 
satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites.  Thus, I would affirm. 
 
 Shortly before Joseph Merlino’s term of supervised 
release was to expire, the U.S. Probation Office filed a 
petition alleging that he violated conditions of his supervised 
release that prohibited him from associating with known 
felons and members of La Cosa Nostra.  The District Court 
promptly sought to schedule a hearing to address the 
allegations, but the hearing did not occur until after the term 
of supervised release expired.  In such a situation, § 3583(i) 
governs the District Court’s authority.     
 
 Section 3583(i) permits a district court to adjudicate 
violations of supervised release after the supervised release 
term expires so long as a warrant or summons issues before 
the term expires.  Because there is no assertion here that a 
warrant issued, I turn to whether a summons issued.  Section 
3583 does not define “summons.”  See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i).  
Moreover, unlike summonses for complaints and indictments, 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not have a 
provision that “governs the issuance of a summons or warrant 
on a petition to revoke supervised release.”  United States v. 
Vallee, 677 F.3d 1263, 1265 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Bernardine, 237 F.3d 1279, 1281 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001) (“No 
other rule of criminal procedure, relevant statute or case law 
supports the application of Rules 4 or 9 in the context of a 
supervised release violation hearing where the court already 
has supervisory jurisdiction and authority over the 
defendant.”).  Thus, we must look elsewhere for guidance. 
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 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “summons” as “[a] 
writ or process commencing the plaintiff’s action and 
requiring the defendant to appear and answer.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1665 (10th ed. 2014).  The definition does not 
require a specific document, format, or label.  Thus, the 
absence of a written document here does not preclude a 
finding that the District Court satisfied § 3583(i)’s 
jurisdictional prerequisites.  To determine what constitutes a 
summons in this context, we must therefore ascertain the goal 
Congress sought to achieve in adopting the summons 
requirement. 
 
 In enacting § 3583(i), Congress changed the triggering 
event for the court’s jurisdiction from the filing of a petition 
to the issuance of a warrant or summons.  See United States 
v. Janvier, 599 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 2010).  This choice 
demonstrates that mere notification to the defendant of the 
alleged violation—an object achieved by the U.S. Probation 
Office’s petition—is insufficient to confer subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Instead, Congress required district courts to 
respond to the petition and affirmatively indicate to the 
defendant its intent to adjudicate the alleged violation of 
supervised release.  It is thus the district court’s affirmative 
invocation of its jurisdiction before the term of supervised 
release expires that operates to extend its authority.   
 
 Here, the District Court clearly and affirmatively 
demonstrated to Merlino its intent to adjudicate his alleged 
violation and thus extended its revocation authority.  Acting 
through its Deputy Clerk, the District Court directed the 
parties to appear for a hearing and, as a courtesy, inquired of 
counsel as to their availability.  But for defense counsel’s 
request to delay setting an exact date, written notice would 
3 
 
have issued before the supervised release term expired.  The 
fact that a formal written document embodying the hearing 
date was not transmitted before the period expired does not 
change the fact that the District Court affirmatively acted 
during the period of supervised release to invoke its authority 
to adjudicate the violation and only delayed issuing a written 
document because defense counsel asked it to delay selecting 
a date.   
 
 Allowing defense counsel to play a role in selecting 
the date ensured that Merlino’s right to counsel of choice was 
respected.  Merlino wanted a particular attorney to appear at 
the hearing and obviously was willing to wait until he was 
available.  The District Court, having already taken 
affirmative action to exercise its authority before the end of 
Merlino’s supervised release term, merely delayed selecting a 
specific date and memorializing it in writing to ensure 
Merlino’s counsel of choice was available.  It would be an 
odd result to deprive the District Court of the power to 
address a violation of its judgment where it invoked its 
authority to convene a prompt hearing to address the violation 
and only delayed selecting a specific date to enable Merlino’s 
counsel of choice to appear.   
 
 Moreover, the District Court’s actions furthered 
Congress’s goal of ensuring prompt adjudication of violations 
of supervised release.  By requiring court action during the 
period of supervised release in the form of commencing the 
process of convening a hearing, Congress ensured that 
petitions did not languish and only required an alleged 
violator to address them when the District Court acted during 
the supervised release period to convene a proceeding.  The 
events here, where the District Court affirmatively 
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demonstrated its intent to hold a hearing and took steps to set 
a hearing date during the period of supervised release, fulfill 
the purpose of the statute and thus satisfy the jurisdictional 
prerequisites.   
 
 Finally, this reading of the word “summons” as used in 
§ 3583(i) is also consistent with the nature of the relationship 
between the court and a defendant on supervised release.  
Defendants on supervised release have previously appeared in 
court and are subject to a judgment of the court and its 
requirements concerning their conduct while on supervised 
release.  Defendants who appear in court as a result of a 
summons issued in connection with complaints and 
indictments, on the other hand, have no pre-existing 
relationship with the court.  Greater formality in summonses 
issued to these defendants makes clear to them their 
obligation to appear—a formality not needed in the 
supervised release context.  A more informal summons 
requirement for supervised release violations is also 
consistent with the fact that violations of supervised release 
are adjudicated based upon a lesser standard of proof and are 
decided by a judge and not a jury.  United States v. Dees, 467 
F.3d 847, 854-55 (3d Cir. 2006).  Thus, reading the word 
“summons” in the context in which it is used and remaining 
mindful of the purpose it serves further bolsters a reading that 
the word “summons” here contemplates an affirmative act of 
the court to gather the parties to address the alleged violation 
of its judgment.     
 
 In short, § 3583(i)’s jurisdictional prerequisites were 
satisfied.  Although a written document embodying the 
agreed-upon hearing date did not issue before the expiration 
of the term, other events occurred that were functionally 
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equivalent to and served the purpose of a summons.  Thus, 
the District Court had jurisdiction to conduct a hearing to 
determine whether Merlino violated the conditions of his 
supervised release.  Because the evidence adduced at that 
hearing supported the District Court’s conclusion that 
Merlino violated the associational restrictions embodied in 
the conditions of his supervised release, the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in ordering revocation.   
 
 For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the 
District Court and respectfully dissent in part from the 
majority opinion.   
